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Abstract: This study examines whether there has been a decline in the risk of death
by battle during wars, testing the ’long peace’ hypothesis. The analysis relies on the
Expanded War Dataset (Gleditsch, 2004) covering inter- and inter-state wars between
1816–2007. Using untransformed data on war sizes, the estimates do not provide empirical
evidence for a decline in war over time. However, normalising the data for global human
population does illustrate a likely decline in war from 1947 onwards. The results indicate
that despite strong population growth wars have not become more severe.
Wether war has declined in recent history has been been the subject of much, and
intense, debate recently. Research suggests that fewer wars are breaking out while more
are terminating (Goldstein, 2011), and that violence in general has been on the decline
(Pinker, 2011). Indeed, since the end of the Second World War (1939–45) there has
been an apparent decline in the risk of death by battle (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005;
Lacina et al., 2006); a trend that does not seem to be abating (Pettersson and Eck,
2018; Pettersson et al., 2019). The relatively peaceful period in contemporary history —
from 1945 onwards — has been dubbed the ’long peace’ (Gaddis, 1986). A term coined
somewhat optimistically just four decades after the ending of one of the most cataclysmic
events in recorded human history.
Some studies challenge the idea of the ’long peace’, arguing there is no empirical evidence
to support this claim based on the analysis of data on interstate wars (Clauset, 2018)
and extremely large wars (Cirillo and Taleb, 2016) — with statistical inference based on
the fat-tailed distribution of wars sizes (Richardson, 1948; Cederman, 2003; González-
Val, 2016). Indeed, the ’long peace’ can be criticised for being somewhat Eurocentric.
Although violent armed conflict has been reduced greatly across the European continent,
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during the Cold War (1946–89) other regions in the world suffered greatly under the
strain of war: Africa as a result of decolonisation (Arnold, 2017); and most notably Asia,
which was arguably the Cold War’s main battlefield, with major powers pitted against
each other, both directly and indirectly (Chamberlin, 2018) — see Wimmer and Min
(2009) for an exposition on war location.1
Studies refuting the ’long peace’ or decline-of-war hypothesis clash with empirical regu-
larities in the data identified by other work which does illustrate a decreasing trend in
war as a function of time (Martelloni et al., 2018). Recent contributions to this debate
have focused predominantly on identifying changepoints in the war size distribution;
assessing points in time after which the distribution changed indicating a decline in war
(measured by the number of battle-deats). Using this approach 1950 and 1965 have been
identified as potential changepoints for interstate wars (Cunen et al., 2018), while other
studies, using a broader sample of wars, have identified potential changepoints around
1950 (Fagan et al., 2019; Spagat and van Weezel, 2020), with the 1830s, 1910, and 1994
as other contenders (Fagan et al., 2019).
The study presented in this paper is similar in spirit to the changepoint-oriented stud-
ies. But whereas the existing work employs complex statistical methods, and focuses
predominantly on war sizes, this study takes a simpler approach and focuses on the
risk of death in battle. To test whether there has been a decline in war, and when this
potential decline started, the analysis relies on inference of the binomial proportion of
war sizes. Specifically, the frequency of wars of a particular size can be measures as a
proportion of the total number of wars, both before and after a designated changepoint.
This proportion can be straightforwardly modeled as a set of Bernoulli trials using the
binomial model. Bayesian inference is used to estimate the distribution of the parameters.
This approach provides the advantage of producing estimates which allow a probabilistic
interpretation. This in contrast with quantities of interest obtained through orthodox
hypothesis tests with accompanying p-values (e.g. Spagat and van Weezel (2020)).
Using a comprehensive dataset covering wars between 1816–2007 (Gleditsch, 2004), the
analysis provides some empirical evidence for a decline in war; specifically from 1947
onwards. The estimated probability that the risk of being killed in battle is lower between
1947–2007 compared to 1816—1946 is at least 0.66; a threshold at which we can state
with some certainty that a decline has occurred (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). However, it
is important to note that this decline is only apparent when war sizes are normalised
for the total global population (to factor in the average risk of someone being killed in
battle). Although the raw untransformed data exhibits similar patterns, the estimated
probabilities are much lower. As such, these provide no convincing evidence in favour
1From a historical perspective war has been on the wane in Central- and South-America (Bates et al.,
2007). But while the proportion of war (measured relative to the total number of wars globally) has
increased in Asia in recent years (Aas Rustad et al., 2011), parts of the continent have experienced a
substantial decline in warfare (Svensson and Lindgren, 2011) (e.g. Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Viet Nam). For a broader discussion on modern war see Wimmer and Min (2006).
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of the decline-of-war hypothesis, but neither do they suggest that things have gotten
worse.
There are some other important caveats concerning the analysis of the results and the
interpretation. There is the data quality, particularly the measurement of the number
of battle-deaths. It is very plausible that the reported number of deaths are measured
with substantial error; most importantly they potentially measure different concepts for
different wars, mixing direct and indirect deaths (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005). Although
other studies acknowledge the measurement error they tend to be silent with regard to
the concept that enters the analysis; using the data as-is. The practical implication of
this is that it is actually hard to make like-for-like comparisons without the analysis
relying on some heroic assumptions. For this particular study that the estimated war
sizes are not off by more than half an order of magnitude. In addition, although there
has been a substantial increase in global population over time (Roser et al., 2013), this
has not corresponded, so it seems, to an increase in war severity. Some have pointed
to a possible explanation in improvements in military medicine (Fazal, 2014), although
this account seems to neglect other, more long-term, technological advances linked to
mobilization levels and army size (Onorato et al., 2014) which are strongly linked to
fatality numbers (Oka et al., 2017).
Data
Information on wars is taken from the Expanded War Dataset (EWD) compiled by
Gleditsch (2004). This dataset covers both intra- and inter-state wars between 1816–2007
(N = 570). The analysis includes both war types as there is no theoretical justification
to analyse them in separation (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013) or focus exclusively on
interstate wars as others have done. Excluding civil wars could potentially lead to
erroneous conclusions since this type of war has been increasing over time (Miranda
et al., 2016). Although the EWD is a comprehensive dataset, it likely suffers from some
measurement error. Most notable caveat of the dataset is that it only includes war with
a minimal size of 103 battle-deaths (64 wars actually have this specific size). As such,
smaller wars are excluded from the analysis, which could bias the results against the
decline-of-war hypothesis. In addition, there could be a bias arising from reporting error,
both in terms of the number of battle-deaths as well as the number of wars itself (indeed,
the EWD is preferred over the commonly used Correlates of War data as it addresses a
number of biases arising from coding decisions (Gleditsch, 2004)). The extent of this
error is unknown and deserves more attention in future research. Finally, there is the
issue that the number of battle-deaths might represent different concepts for different
wars as discussed by (Lacina et al., 2006).
War size wit is measured as the total number of battle-related deaths for the entire duration
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Figure 1: Expanded War Dataset: Distribution of war sizes over time (1816–2007)
smoothed with loess smoother with span of one third (solid line).
(a) original data; (b) population-normalised data.
Data source: Gleditsch (2004).
of war i. To approximate the risk of dying during battle, the war size is normalised
using total world population taken at the year of onset t with 1816 ≤ t ≤ 2007. Hence
normalised war size w˜it equals witpopt . To create an annual time-series of world population a
number of different data sources are used (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2010; van Zanden et al.,
2014; United Nations Population Division, 2017). Missing values, most common before
1950, are linearly interpolated. Figure 1 displays the data; table 1 provides summary
statistics.
Methods
The quantity of interest is the frequency of wars with minimal magnitude m; both before
and after potential changepoint tˆ. This frequency can be measured as a proportion
relative to the total number of wars for each period and the binomial model can be used
to model wars with size ≥ m as a set of Bernoulli trials Xi, (i=1,...,n). The underlying
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Table 1: Summary statistics (N = 570)
Mean Median Range Skewness Taila
War size 0.8 ·105 (8 ·105) 0.04 ·105 [103; 2 · 107] 18.2 0.086
War size normalised 0.4 ·101 (4 ·101) 0.03 ·101 [0.02; 781] 17.3 0.074
Note: Standard deviation (between parentheses)
a: Proportion of observations that is larger than the mean.
assumptions is that the wars are independent of each other, in other words that the
war-generating process is memoryless. As such, no time trend is assumed, instead a
stationary process governs the frequency and distribution of war sizes (Clauset, 2020).
This does not seem to be a too heroic assumption given the relative constant rate of war
outbreaks over time, which seems stationary around a mean (figure 2a). In addition the
time between wars follows a random Poisson process (Clauset, 2018) as illustrated by
figure 2b.2
Let Y be the total observed number of wars with size ≥ m and n the total number
of wars.3 The probability of war y being of size ≥ m can be denoted by θ (ie. the
frequency). Y follows a binomial distribution: Y ∼ B(n, θ) which entails that the
conditional probability of y based on θ is given by:
p(y|θ) =
(
n
y
)
θy(1− θ)n−y for y = 0, 1, ..., n (1)
Within this frameworks inference of θ is based on the observed proportion p = y/n which
serves as a point estimate. The likelihood function can be written as:
L(θ) ∝ p(y|θ) (2)
2This assumption also implies there is such a thing as a common global war-generating process. Whether
this assumption is tenable is up for debate, and when violated could risk the analysis being subject
to an ecological fallacy. The ’long peace’ hypothesis does rely on this assumption as the decline in
war is linked to a global pacifying process where diffusion of norms and values, for instance through
trade and increased connectivity between communities, make societies less bellicose.
3This section draws from Bolstad and Curran (2016).
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Figure 2: Conflict onset frequency.
Note: (a) Number of conflict onsets per year. The dotted line indicates the
sample average (∼3), the solid line denotes a 5-year moving average; (b)
minimal number of years between conflicts. Solid circles indicate the observed
proportions, the line indicates the expected proportions based on the average
of 103 random Poisson distributions: Pois(λ) with λ set equal to the sample
average (0.34). Data source: Gleditsch (2004).
where L can be estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to obtain the
most likely value for θ given the data.
Testing whether there has been a decline in war, of interest is whether the value of θ
has changed over time, specifically between two periods. To this end orthodox tests of
statistical significance could be employed, but these come with two important caveats.
First, they rely on asymptotic properties which can be problematic in small samples.
Second, they only offer a binary answer — to reject or accept the null hypothesis —
rather than information about the probability with which a certain development has
occurred. Therefore this analysis used Bayesian inference to circumvent these issues. In
this context and additional advantage of the Bayesian approach is that prior information,
or existing beliefs, about the frequency of wars can easily be incorporated in the analysis
using Bayes’ Theorem. Here θ is conditional on outcome y (and n which is omitted for
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ease of notation) with the posterior distribution for θ given by:
p(θ|y) = p(θ)p(y|θ)
p(y) ,with p(y) =
∫
p(y|θ)p(θ)dθ (3)
p(y) is a scaling factor denoting the marginal density of the data such that the probabilities
sum to one. Omitting this scaling factor Bayes’ Theorem can be rewritten in a simplified
form:
p(θ|y) ∝ p(y|θ)p(θ) (4)
In plain English this formulation states that the posterior distribution is proportional to
the likelihood times the prior distribution. As already established the likelihood of θ can
be described by the Bernoulli distribution which only leaves the prior to be specified.
Since θ is defined on the unit interval (0 < θ < 1) the Beta distribution — Beta(a, b)
— would be a natural choice as it is bounded by the same interval. Indeed, the Beta
distribution is a conjugate prior for the Bernoulli distribution, which entails that it will
produce a Beta-distributed posterior; ie. defined on the unit interval.
The Beta distribution also provides flexibility in specifying the its shape parameters (a, b),
which is useful with regard to the prior distribution. Specifying a prior one could opt for
using a diffuse prior assigning equal probability to different war frequencies. In that case
the estimate for θ would be similar to what one would obtain using MLE. But it would
also ignore the available information on war frequencies, specifically the fact that the
distribution of war sizes is fat-tailed (Richardson, 1948; Cederman, 2003; González-Val,
2016). Hence, based on prior beliefs we would expect that the frequency of huge wars is
smaller than the frequency of large wars which is smaller than the frequency of small
wars. Therefore, with the prior distribution p(θ) specified as θ ∼ Beta(a, b), the shape
parameters are defined such that they capture existing beliefs. In this particular case
a is the number of wars of size ≥ m before the changepoint and b the number of wars
with smaller magnitudes (meaning the the total number of wars before the changepoint
is given by a+ b). In practical terms this means that the posterior distribution of θ can
be inferred by sampling from the Beta distribution with shape parameters set to y + a
and n− y + b as illustrated by equation 5 below:
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p(θ) ∝ θa−1(1− θ)b−1 (5a)
L(θ) = θy(1− θ)n−y (5b)
p(θ|y) ∝ L(θ)p(θ) (5c)
∝ θy(1− θ)n−y · θa−1(1− θ)b−1 (5d)
∝ θy+a−1(1− θ)n−y+b−1 (5e)
= Beta(y + a, n− y + b) (5f)
The posterior is estimated using 104 draws from the Beta distribution. The shape
parameters are defined partitioning the data across time and war size. Using the time-
series variation of the data, each year t is considered a potential changepoint tˆ, with
1859 ≤ tˆ ≤ 1970. Admittedly this interval might seem somewhat arbitrary, but the
boundaries are actually theoretically informed. Research has illustrated an upward shift
in military size and mobilization levels — important determinants of war fatalities (Oka
et al., 2017) — from 1859 onwards, followed by a decline from 1970 (Onorato et al., 2014).
These trends coincide with the advance of railways, facilitating higher mobilisation rates,
and improvements in guided-missile technology, which are correlated with reductions in
army size (Onorato et al., 2014).
Splitting the data at year tˆ information from years t ≤ tˆ is used to specify parameters
of the prior distribution — p(θ) : θ ∼ Beta(a, b). The values for a, b are determined by
a second data partition based on war size m. Where a is the number of wars with size
≥ m and b the number of wars with size < m (see the example of pseudo-code 1).
Naturally the reported number of people killed by a particular war comes with a degree
of uncertainty — in addition to other biases previously discussed; therefore the war
sizes are log-transformed to the base 10 (Richardson, 1948) and the data is split using a
relatively small number of cut-off points. The data is unlikely to be fully accurate given
the issues measuring war-related mortality (Østerud, 2008; Spagat et al., 2009; Hacker,
2011; Jewell et al., 2018).
To gauge whether a decline in war has occurred a relatively simple measure is used: The
difference between the prior and posterior distribution. If no change occurred before
and after tˆ then the prior distribution should be a good description of the war size
distribution for the period following the changepoint. As such, the ’new’ data would
not nudge us towards adjusting the prior and hence the difference between prior and
posterior should be negligible, close to zero on average. If there is indeed a decline in
war — here measured as the change in proportion of wars of a particular size — the
expectation is that the difference between posterior and prior is negative. The proportion
of relatively larger wars should be higher for the prior then it is for the posterior.
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To translate this into a workable statistic the fraction of negative values relative to the
total distribution is calculated. Recall that for the prior and posterior there are 104
estimated values. These are subtracted from each other and the quantity of interest is
the fraction of negative values. This measure has a probabilistic interpretation as it can
be thought of as a probability of decline, where higher values correspond to a decline in
wars with size ≥ m (see figure A1 for an example).
Results
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Figure 3: Decline in war severity — estimated probability (raw data).
Note: (a) Probability of decline of war of size ≥ m for all potential turning
points tˆ with 1856 ≤ tˆ ≤ 1989 denoted by light-grey lines; m on interval
(3, 3.5, ..., 7); (b) probability of decline average across all war sizes. Solid
horizontal line denotes probability of 0.5; dashed line probability of 0.66. Data
source: Gleditsch (2004).
Figure 3a summarises the results using the raw untransformed data, displaying the
probability of decline for all possible changepoints across different magnitudes. Naturally
the estimate is zero for war size m ≥ 3 as this is the lower bound of the data; wars
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are included in the data if they attain at least 103 battle-related deaths. In general
there is not much empirical evidence in favour of a decline-in-war type of hypothesis.
Only at the left end of the interval do the results show that for a subset of years the
probability of decline is relatively high, but only for war sizes ∼ m ≥ 6 (wars with a
severity above 106 are extremely rare). Except for this particular range, the estimated
probabilities rarely exceed the threshold of 0.66, indicating that a decline in war is as
likely as no decline (quantifying uncertainty the guidelines of Mastrandrea et al. (2010)
are followed). The estimates presented in panel (a) potentially obscure relevant temporal
patterns. Therefore the estimated probabilities are averaged at annual level, as shown in
figure 3b. Note that an underlying assumption of this approach is that a decline in war is
noticeable across the whole rage of magnitudes. This assumption does not hold entirely
as the proportion of wars with size m ≥ 3 will always be 1 due to the manner in which
the data is collected. In addition it also entails that shifts in the war-size distribution
are unaccounted for. The results show that across a range of potential changepoints a
decline in war seems unlikely. Only following the Second World War does the probability
indicating a change start to creep upward, but it remains low in absolute value peaking
at 0.37.
A caveat of the raw battle-deaths data is that it does not account for changes in the
risk of people dying during a war (Lacina et al., 2006). Therefore the data is normalised
for global population; the results are shown in figure 4. The results display a similar
pattern to those reported in figure 3, but there is a noticeable shift upwards, along the
y-axis, indicating higher probabilities of a change, favouring the decline-of-war hypothesis
(Fig. 4a). Surprisingly though this is a trend across different potential changepoints.
For a broad range of war sizes the estimated probability of decline surpasses the 0.66
threshold. Averaging the probabilities, to get a single statistic for each year, shows an
increase in the probability of decline following the First World War (1914–18) and around
the Second World War (1939–45) (Note that the wars are indexed by their year of onset).
Indeed 1940 is the first in which the average estimated probability exceeds 0.66 after
which it doesn’t drop below this threshold. Of note is that the estimated probability is
also relatively high (≥ 0.5) during the period of European colonisation of Africa through
the 1880-90s.
The estimates point to 1947 as the most likely changepoint; using the maximum of the
estimated probabilities. Therefore an additional test is carried out partitioning the data
at 1946 and focusing on the generated predictions of the prior distribution and how well
they predict the proportion of wars between 1947–2007 (see pseudo-code 2). Similar to
the previous test the observed proportions of the prior period (1816–1946) are used to
generate predictions for the posterior period (1947–2007) using the Beta distribution.
The average of 104 draws from the prior distribution serves as point prediction, also
accounting for the uncertainty associated with the estimate using an uncertainty interval.
Figure 5 plots the results for the raw (a) and normalised (b) data. The panels display the
observed proportions relative to the predicted proportion, along with a 66% uncertainty
interval. Between 1946–2007 there is an apparent increase in wars with magnitudes
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Figure 4: Decline in war severity — estimated probability (normalised data).
Note: (a) Probability of decline of war of size ≥ m for all potential turning
points tˆ with 1856 ≤ tˆ ≤ 1989 denoted by light-grey lines; m on interval
(1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100); (b) probability of decline average across all war sizes.
Solid horizontal line denotes probability of 0.5; dashed line probability of 0.66.
Data source: Gleditsch (2004).
ranging from 103 to about 104.5. There is large uncertainty associated with the estimates
for wars in the range of 105/106 battle-deaths. This is most probably the result of a small
number of data points. The ratio drops to zero after 106 as no wars of this magnitude
have occurred since 1946, yet.
Based on the raw battle-deaths data we would be inclined to draw the conclusion that
there indeed has not been a noticeable decline in war severity across time. The data
normalised for population provides conflicting evidence however. Importantly, taking
into account the developments in population growth over the past two centuries — which
have not been hindered by the positive checks of war — the historical pattern of war (ie.
wars between 1816–1946) tends to over-predict war severity for the period hence. Even
after accounting for the uncertainty in the generated predictions the result show that
the observed proportions of war severity are around only half what would be expected,
for most magnitudes, as illustrated by figure 3b. There is a noticeable exception to
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this pattern, namely the peak at around 32 deaths per 105 people. Here the observed
proportions are more in line with expectations based on historical data.
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Figure 5: Predicted proportions: observed proportion of wars of size ≥ m relative to
the predicted numbers using 1947 as turning point.
Note: (a), raw data; (b), normalised data; dashed lines denote 66% uncer-
tainty interval. Data source: Gleditsch (2004).
Conclusions
The empirical analysis provides little empirical evidence in favour of the ’long peace’
hypothesis when exclusively focusing on unadjusted battle-deaths data, consistent with
existing work. The estimations show that the probability of a decline in war has increased
over time, but at no point does it exceed any threshold indicating that a decline in
war is more likely than no change in the assumed global war-generating process. The
conclusions changes however when considering population-adjusted data to account for
the average risk of being killed in battle during a war. Using this approach the results
echo earlier studies on changepoint in war, indicating that the period after the Second
World War does indeed seem to be relatively less belligerent in terms of adjusted fatality
12
numbers. These results also illustrate that despite substantial population growth wars
have not become more severe over time.
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Appendix
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for estimating change in war severity
1: Set N = 104
2: Consider turning point tˆ in {1859, 1970}
3: Define {k, n} where k and n are number of wars before and after time tˆ, respectively
4: Consider magnitude m in range(m)
5: Define {a, y} where a and y are number of wars before and after time tˆ with minimal
size m, respectively
6: Sample p(θ) = Beta(N, a, k − a)
7: Estimate p(θ|y) = Beta(N, y + a, n− y + b) with b = k − a
8: Calculate D = p(θ|y)− p(θ)
9: Calculate Pr(decline) = length(D[D < 0])/length(D) where D[D < 0] are all the
elements of D with a value <0
10: Repeat step 4–9 for each individual m in range(m)
11: Repeat step 2–10 for each individual tˆ in {1859 : 1970}
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Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code for predicting proportion of wars with minimal size m
1: Set N = 104
2: Consider magnitude m in range(m)
3: Define {a, a+ b} where a is total number of wars between 1816–1946 with minimal
size m and a+ b is total number of wars between 1816–1946
4: Define {y, n} where y is total number of wars between 1947–2007 with minimal size
m and n is total number of wars between 1947–2007
5: Generate pˆ = Beta(N, a, b)
6: Calculate observed proportion p = y/n
7: Calculate p
pˆ
8: Repeat step 2–7 for each individual m in range(m)
(a)
Estimated proportion
D
en
si
ty
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
(b)
Posterior - prior
-0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04
Figure A1: Example of applied method.
(a) displays the estimated posterior (dashed line) and prior (solid line)
distribution for wars with size ≥ 106 for the data partitioned at t = 1950.
(b) illustrates there is seemingly little difference between the prior and
posterior. Indeed, the probability of decline is only 0.25 — indicating that
an increase in wars with size ≥ 106 is actually more likely.
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